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Introduction
Various proposals have recently been made as to the
possible neural sites supporting awareness, such as
frontal cortex,1 hippocampus2 and neural assemblies
that support working memory.3,4 Not all neural 
sites in the processing path are of prime importance
for consciousness; for example several experiments
indicate the secondary character of activity in 
primary visual area V1 for awareness of visual
inputs.5,6 Thus there is support for a two-stage model
of awareness, in which specialized cortical areas are
involved in unconscious preprocessing with later
areas supporting the direct creation of awareness 
of inputs. There is also evidence for the relevance of
attention to awareness, where changes of response 
of neurons in various areas of cortex are observed
under attended vs unattended conditions.7 It has 
been suggested that attention is used to bind different
codes of objects together to lead to awareness.8
However while such binding needs to occur in object
recognition in which attention is focused it may not
do so in a more unfocused attentional state where
divided attention occurs. Moreover further cortical
regions are activated under focused attentional
conditions beyond those solely for awareness.9 Thus
the lowest level of awareness (which we tentatively
identify with unfocused or divided attention) must
be included. The original two-stage model has 
thus to be expanded to involve three stages10: prepro-
cessing, first emergence of awareness and then
attentionally guided awareness. It is this three-stage 
model (schematically shown in Fig. 1) which is
analysed here, and experimental data reported on
which support the model at a very preliminary level.
One of the basic predictions made by the three-
stage model of awareness of Figure 1 is that activa-
tion levels in the three separate stages will, to a first
approximation, dissociate under suitable task condi-
tions. Thus under subliminal or unattended condi-
tions it is expected that activity in response to a given
input will only be observable in the relevant first-
stage modules. Under the same stimulus input condi-
tions but now with passive awareness both first- and
second-stage module activity should be observed,
whilst under attended conditions to the same input
further third-stage modules will be activated by a
suitable attentional load. Such dissociation has been
observed in the n-back paradigm,11 in which a subject
has to remember the recurrence of an input stimulus
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THE various components which together make up the
complex state of consciousness require neural support
involving a connected network of many brain areas at
differing levels. At the lowest level is non-aware
processing, of which there is not direct awareness. There
are also modules involved in processing with awareness
but without focussed attention. Finally there must be a
set of modules involved in directing attention in a
controlled manner. We expect to be able to dissociate the
various components of the three-stage network by using
different levels of attention. The results of an auditory
experiment performed under three different levels of
awareness and attention are analysed to show support
for the three-stage model of awareness. The relevant
auditory areas are delineated. NeuroReport 9: 1797–1792
© 1998 Rapid Science Ltd.
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that occurred n inputs previously. It was found that
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was not activated for
short time delays (corresponding to n < 2) but was
for larger values of n (for delays of > 20 s).
The predictions at the simplest approximation
level, according to the model of Figure 1, of activa-
tion levels of the modules involved in the processing,
are shown in Fig. 2. They are given in terms of hypo-
thetical z-scores representing normalized differences
between baseline and current activation, and indicate
that under the varying attentional demands of the
different task conditions there are expected to be
levels of activation which are roughly constant across
all conditions for the first-stage modules, the second-
stage modules being differentiated only by being acti-
vated for the passive or attentional parts of the tasks,
whilst the third-stage modules are only active in the
attended state. It is these predictions, and more gener-
ally the three-stage model itself, which we test in this
paper, using the results of the experiment briefly
presented in Ref. 12.
Materials and Methods
The study used fMRI scans conducted on 10 normal
adults. Functional brain activation was mapped in a
1.5 T Siemens (Magnetom Vision) scanner equipped
with echo planar imaging (EPI) and a standard
radiofrequency head coil. Informed consent was
obtained from all subjects about the nature and
possible consequences of the study.
MRI parameters: Sequence parameters were as
follows: echo time (TE) 66 ms; repeat time (TR) 5 s;
field of view = 200 · 200 mm; spin-flip angle alpha =
90° ; matrix size = 64 · 64; in-plane resolution = 3.125
· 3.125 mm; slice thickness = 3 mm; inter-slice gap =
0.3 mm. Using a mid-sagittal scout image, 16 axial
slices were oriented along the anterior–posterior
commissure (AC-PC) plane, with the lowermost slice
positioned to be 20 mm below the AC-PC line. In
addition, high resolution, T1-weighted anatomical
images of the entire brain were obtained in 3D 
using a pulse sequence with the following parame-
ters: TR = 40 ms; TE = 5 ms; alpha = 40° ; 1 excitation;
field of view = 250 mm; in-plane matrix = 256 · 256;
128 sagittal slices with 1.25 mm slice thickness.
Experimental protocol: Each series began with three
baseline images (15 s interval) which were discarded
to allow the signal to reach a steady state, followed
by 48 images during which activation alternated 
with rest every 30 s (60 s/cycle, 12 images/cycle, 
4 cycles). Auditory stimuli were presented binuarally
using a digital playback system, a magnetically
shielded transducer system and air conduction
through paired plastic tubes with suppression of
ambient scanner noise by about 15 dB. During 
each experimental condition a series of 51 images was
acquired. Each series consisted of multiple periods 
of baseline, during which subjects heard only the
J. G. Taylor et al.
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FIG. 1. The three-stage model for the creation and control of aware-
ness. The Modules at the lowest or first stage are denoted A1, A2,
. . . and are involved in low level feature analysis in the appropriate
modality. A number of modules are involved in such processing. At
the next stage are sites of buffer memory in posterior cortex,
denoted B1, B2, . . . They are fed by preprocessed activity from first
stage modules, and are coupled to each other in order to run a
competition by lateral inhibition so as to select the most appropriate
percept, given earlier context still present in activity traces on these
modules, to enter phenomenal awareness. The final third stage is
composed of modules which are frontal and possess attentional
feedback control both to the second-stage modules, so as to refresh
activity there, and to the first-stage modules to reduce or increase
stimulus selectivity. Feedback is shown explicitly from the third to
lower stages although it will also be present from the second to
first stage (not all feedback is shown explicitly).
FIG. 2. A schematic of averaged activation levels (given by z-scores)
predicted by the three-stage awareness model across the task condi-
tions (a) unattended, (b) passive sensing and (c) attended processing
to detect a particular parameter of the incoming stimulus. The same
stimulus is assumed used in all the three conditions. The prediction
is only the simplest approximation, neglecting modulatory feedback
attentional effects from the third stage (and possible additional
second) stage modules. The continuous lines represent the aver-
aged activity over the relevant stages; the dashed lines denote a
more realistic set of a range of activity levels to be expected form
different multi-area stages under the three different paradigms.
Moreover there may be difference between the overall activity 
levels in the three paradigms. Thus the heights of the curves in (a),
(b) and (c) are only relative.
ambient machine noise, alternating with periods of
activation, during which prepared auditory stimuli
were delivered. The total duration of each image
series was about 5 min. The auditory stimuli used
throughout, and for which different levels of aware-
ness were required, were 16 bit, digitally sampled
consonant–vowel syllables (/ka; /ta, /pa, /ga; /da;
/ba/). The onset, duration (500 ms), intensity and
fundamental frequency of the stimuli were edited and
synchronized. These syllables were randomized.
One-third of the trials consisted of the syllable /ta/
serving as target syllable in the experiment. Visual
stimuli used as a distractor comprised flickering light
delivered in the frequency range of 3–4 Hz. It was
not regarded as practical to use a distracting sound 
input since we had no way of differentiating the
regions supporting consciousness for the two inputs.
However, the input (the stream of CV syllables) to
the subjects was kept constant throughout the experi-
ment. Three conditions were used involving increas-
ing attention to the auditory stimulus: (I) ignore
auditorily presented syllables, but attend to a flick-
ering light (inattention); (II) passive listening to the
syllables (passive); and (III) discriminate amongst 
the syllables (attention).12 Ten subjects, with a range
of ages, were scanned with eyes open with digitally
recorded consonant (CV)-syllables presented at a rate
of 1 Hz. The visual stimulus used in the inattention
condition was a flickering light in the frequency range
of 3–5 Hz delivered to goggles fitted to the head coil.
During rest subjects listened to the scanner noise;
these alternated with periods of activation. During
the inattention condition subjects were instructed to
ignore all of the auditorily presented syllables but 
to scan the flicker light for changing frequency, 
while during the attention condition subjects were
instructed to detect the syllable /ta/. Occurrence of
the targets (/ta/ and changing frequency) was indi-
cated by briefly lifting the index finger of the left
hand which was recorded outside the magnet.
FMRI activation tasks: Subjects were scanned with
eyes open and room lights dimmed. Auditory stimuli
were presented at a rate of 1 Hz. During rest subjects
listened to the scanner noise, which alternated with
periods of activation. Subjects were exposed to the
three experimental conditions in a randomized order,
one being the dual task involving both the auditory
and light stimuli and the remaining two solely audi-
tory. For the dual task subjects were simultaneously
exposed to a flickering light delivered in a frequency
range of 3–5 Hz via goggles fitted to the head coil.
Image analysis: Image analysis was performed on a
SPARC 20 workstation using MATLAB and
SPM96b software.13–15 All images were realigned to
correct for head movement between scans15 and then
were coregistered and transformed into a standard
stereotactic space corresponding to the atlas of
Talairach and Tournoux.16 In this space one pixel
represents 2 · 2 mm in the x and y dimensions, with
an interplanar distance of 2 mm. These sterotaxically
transformed functional data sets from each subject
were smoothed slightly (Gaussian filter of root mean
square radius 4 mm) to compensate for normal vari-
ation in sulcal/gyral anatomy across subjects. Voxels
that had values > 0.8 of the volume mean in all 
the images were selected to restrict analysis to
intracranial regions. The effects of global whole
volume activity and time were removed using linear
regression and sine/cosine functions as confounds
(corresponding to high-pass filtering the time series
to remove low frequency artifacts due to cardio-
respiratory and other cyclical components).
Statistical parameter mapping: For statistical
analysis the sterotaxically normalized fMRI time-
series data of the 10 subjects were pooled. The alter-
nating periods of baseline and activation were
modelled using a delayed box-car reference vector
accounting for the delayed cerebral blood flow after
stimulus presentation. Significantly activated pixels
were searched for by using the General Linear Model
approach for time-series data suggested by Friston
and colleagues.13–15 For this we defined a design
matrix comprising contrasts testing for significant
activations during auditory stimulation in each condi-
tion separately (tests for simple main effects) and
testing for differential activations between conditions
(tests for interactions). Only voxels exceeding a 
z-score of 5 (p < 0.001, corrected for multiple com-
parisons) as height threshold and belonging to a
cluster of > 20 voxels (160 ml) were considered as
significant. These voxel were superimposed on a
rendered standardized brain16 (Fig. 3).
Results
The qualitative predictions shown in Fig. 2 were
tested using the data taken under the three condi-
tions of inattention, passive and attention.12 In
general, the three conditions activated perisylvian
brain areas comprising BA 41, 42 ,21 and 22. The
conditions with the highest level of awareness
additionally activated frontal regions. The smallest
spatial extent of activation was found in the inatten-
tion condition (Fig. 3), while there was an increase
in the total area activated caused by new regions
arising in going successively from the inattention to
passive conditions and then to the attention condi-
tion. The data are analysed and presented more fully 
in Table 1, which displays stereotaxic centre of 
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mass coordinates and size of activation clusters for
the inattention condition as well as the passive–
inattention, and discriminate–passive differences.
From both Fig. 3 and Table 1 it can be seen that
auditory stimulation under the first three conditions
mainly causes activity in perisylvian brain regions.
These regions are therefore supportive of the
predicted activation levels across the three conditions
of the non-aware modules 1 in Fig. 2. Most impor-
tantly, under the passive condition there are addi-
tional areas activated on the right and left middle
temporal gyrus, the right and left superior temporal
gyrus as well as the left middle frontal gyrus. Finally
the difference between discriminate and passive
shows up strong right and left-sided frontal activa-
tions, corresponding to the activation of modules 
3 of Fig. 2. The modules of classes 1, 2 and 3 of 
Fig. 2 identified above are summarized in Table 1.
With our use of the statistical parameter z = 5 as 
a threshold in Fig. 3 (which is significant at the 
p = 0.001 level, corrected for multiple comparisons),
a strong cluster of activity shows up in BA46/45 on
the left hemisphere, which is interesting not only
because of being Broca’s area but also because of 
the large extent it presents under the discriminate
condition.
Further support for the predictions of Fig. 2 came
from the fact that signal intensity in those regions
activated in all conditions only differed marginally
(about 1% signal intensity difference from inatten-
tion to passive, and passive to discriminate) while
there were dramatic signal intensity increases in the
additionally activated areas rising from 0 to a
maximum of 14%.
It is necessary to ensure that there was little aware-
ness of the stimuli in the inattention condition for
the data to be relevant to the model. We have eval-
uated that question by requiring the subjects to
indicate the level of success (on 10-point scales
ranging from little success (1) to high success (10))
in performing the first three tasks immediately after
the fMRI scanning and found that the subjects
succeeded well in inattending (mean ± s.d. 9 ± 0.5),
passive listening to (8 ± 2), and discriminating (9 ± 2)
the stimuli. This implies that the corresponding levels
of awareness and attention of the auditory stimuli
under the various conditions were as desired (very
low awareness, high awareness, and high awareness
and attention for the respective conditions I, II and
III) for our interpretation of the data.
J. G. Taylor et al.
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FIG. 3. Surface-projected schematic representation of mean acti-
vated areas on a stereotactically normalized rendered brain: (a) inat-
tention (ignore auditory stimuli but attend to visual stimuli), (b)
passive minus inattention, (c) discriminate minus passive listening.
From the text and Fig. 1 we identify the areas shown under (a) as
stage 1 modules, those under (b) as stage 2 modules and those for
(c) as the modules of stage 3.
Table 1. Stereotaxic center of mass coordinates and size
of activation clusters. We report only positive activation
peaks and activation clusters located within the parenchyma
that exceed a statistical criterion of p < 0.001 (corrected for
multiple comparisons), corresponding to a z score > 5
x y z Zmax No.
voxels
Inattention
R cuneus 10 –94 4 9.3 3846
R superior temporal gyrus 52 –26 6 8 464
L superior temporal gyrus –52 –22 8 8.7 397
Passive–inattention
R superior temporal gyrus 50 –24 4 8.41 1236
L superior temporal gyrus –56 –22 2 8.23 774
L inferior frontal gyrus –38 16 22 7.22 126
R inferior frontal gyrus 48 20 14 6.89 65
Discriminate–passive
R inferior frontal gyrus 40 32 –2 7.7 402
L gyri orbitali –38 28 –10 7.8 298
L inferior frontal gyrus –54 10 –2 6.7 101
R inferior frontal gyrus 46 6 0 6.1 64
L superior temporal 
gyrus (posterior) –54 –34 10 8.8 29
L superior temporal gyrus –56 –20 6 8.9 26
R gyri orbitali 40 30 –16 6.7 24
R cerebellum 12 –68 –12 5.7 22
Stereotaxic coordinates refer to medial-lateral position (x)
relative to midline (positive = right), anterior–posterior
position (y) relative to the anterior commissure (positive =
anterior), and superior-inferior position (z) relative to the
commissural line (positive = superior). L: left, R: right.
Discussion
The simple three-stage model shown in Figs 1 and 2
for the emergence of awareness and its control by
attentional processors has been supported by the 
data reported in Ref. 12, with the results shown in
Fig. 3 and Table 1. It is important to try to validate
the model shown in Fig. 1 in other modalities, as well
as to probe the second approximation to it, taking
better account of the differences between activation
levels across the cortex, for example by the use of
structural modelling. The results presented here in
any case indicate that the three-stage dissociation of
cortical areas for auditory processing is a valid first
approximation to processing of auditory signals.
There are, however, other experimental results which
seem to be at variance with those presented here, and
especially about the change of levels of activation 
of earlier cortical areas under the highest attentional
load as compared to the lowest one.9,17–20 We will
consider each of these results in turn.
Woodruff et al.9 observed important differences in
auditory areas (BA41/42/21/22) when attention was
paid to simultaneously visually and auditorily
presented digits: a decrease was found in the activity
in auditory areas when the visual form of the stimuli
was attended to which was recovered when the
auditory form of the stimuli were noticed. However
there may be competition between the two forms of
presentation of a given concept; the experimental
paradigm is different in our case since quite different
stimuli are being presented in the different moda-
lities. Such a reduced effect is also noticed in 
the lack of an attentional blink between two modal-
ities,21 which is in support of our results. Woldorff 
et al.17 reported that the M100 peak, measured by
MEG in dichoptic listening, was doubled in height
when attention was paid to a tone in that ear while
a different tone in the other ear was neglected.
However the data were analysed only using a single
current dipole, resulting in averaging the neural
activity over a considerable area. An increase of 
the M100 could arise from an increase of the 
total area of neural activation and not from increase
in activation in a given area. Pitch and phonetic
discrimination were required of subjects studied 
by Zattore et al.,18 but no control was made for
awareness; the areas observed are consistent with our
results. The use of a single dipole (in this case for
EEG) also limits the spatial sensitivity of the results
reported by Heinz et al.,19 which involved attention
to left or right of a stimulus array investigated by
both PET for localization and by EEG for temporal
resolution; a similar problem arises in the EEG
analysis of Clark and Hillyard,20 in which subjects
were presented with a patterned stimulus and an
increase of the P1 and N1 amplitudes was detected
under increased attentional load.
There are very few previous studies of the site for
the emergence of awareness in audition. One result
from MEG measurement, of the M100 variation of
position with pitch and frequency,22 claimed that the
pitch perception of a tone has a neural substrate place
prior to cortex. However, this result was based only
on a single dipole fit to the MEG signal, so that it
will be necessary to wait for more general distrib-
uted source analysis of such a MEG experiment, say
along the lines of magnetic field tomography.23 There
is still the difficult problem of reconciling our result
that awareness initially arises in cortex with the claim
of Pantev et al.22 that it is subcortical. In order to
discuss that more fully we turn to a comparison of
awareness in vision and hearing. In the former aware-
ness is known to occur after primary processing 
in V1 in cortex. The feature integration theory of
Ref. 8 indicates in what manner the initially frag-
mented representation of a visual input is brought
together by later attention (which could be diffuse
or focused). By analogy we would expect that prior
primary sensory processing in audition would then
lead in later modules (there are now known to be 
6 or 7 separate auditory areas in total) to awareness
of the sound.
The mismatch-negativity signal (MMN)24 is one
which occurs in primary auditory cortex but is pre-
attentive (it is still present under such a strong
distractor load that awareness of the auditory signal
is completely lost). This result alone indicates that
the interpretation of the results reported by Pantev
et al.22 may be premature, and that only in some later
processing stage are the signals for the pure and mixed
sounds separated. That would agree with the nature
of the MMN signal as well as relate suitably to the
visual processing stages.
In total the present experimental data do not
conflict with our results: attention does not appear
to cause an appreciable increase in activity in the
preprocessing stage 1 areas of Figs 1 and 2, and aware-
ness (or unfocused attention) occurs in a specific site
in cortex separate form the cortical region dedicated
to earlier nonconscious processing. Thus the most
important result of our paper, consistent with the
prediction of Fig. 2 of the three-stage model, is that
there are distinct brain areas (stages 2 and 3 of Figs
1 and 2) which are activated to support, first, aware-
ness (or unfocused attention) and then, directed
attention. This result is important since we can now
extend it to probe in what manner the separate
cortical areas for stages 2 and 3 are contributing to
allow awareness and directed attention to arise. This
is a question to be analysed more carefully by use of
higher temporal resolution, say by EEG and MEG.
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However from our comments on experiments using
such tools single dipole analysis may be too coarse
to be effective.
Conclusion
The data analysed here give support to the three-
stage model of awareness shown in Fig. 1 for audi-
tory processing. They delineate the relevant areas as
superior temporal gyrus, additional areas in the supe-
rior temporal gyrus and a small region in the infe-
rior frontal gyrus and mainly inferior frontal and
orbital gyrus respectively. The level of activity over
these areas was roughly constant across conditions.
We also need to explore the validity of the model in
vision and somatosensation, as well as determine a
more precise and complete map in the cases we have
considered.
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